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LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES AND THE LAW:
A PROGRESS REPORT
Arthur S. Leonard*
I. Introduction
The movement for lesbian and gay rights proceeds in stages. In
the first stage, which I call "Legalization," there is the struggle to
decriminalize homosexual status by obtaining the repeal or judicial
invalidation of laws that penalize sexual contact between same-sex
partners;1 such laws, while not technically creating a status offense
of homosexual orientation, impart the aura of criminality to lesbian
and gay people.2 In the second stage, which I call "Nondiscrimina-
* Professor, New York Law School. Thanks to Todd V. Lamb, New York Law
School Class of 1994, for helpful research assistance. This article is an expanded ver-
sion of a talk given to the Cornell University Gay and Lesbian Alumni Association at
the Cornell Club, New York City, January 19, 1994.
1. The first stage has its roots in the mid-19th century, when isolated law reform-
ers in Central Europe proposed that homosexuality be recognized as a morally neu-
tral phenomenon and that harsh criminal penalties for same-sex behavior be
removed. In the United States, the drive toward "Legalization" began in the 1950's
with successful efforts to persuade the American Law Institute to recommend re-
moval of penalties for private, consensual adult sex in the Model Penal Code. Begin-
ning in the 1960's and accelerating through the 1970's, private consensual adult sex
(including same-sex activity) has been decriminalized in more than half the states,
usually through legislative reform, sometimes through judicial invalidation. For an
excellent summary of this history, see WARREN JOHANSSON & WILLIAM A. PERCY,
OUTING: SHATTERING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE (1994). This trend received a
temporary setback in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, in which the
Supreme Court held by 5-4 vote that Georgia's felony sodomy law did not violate the
right of privacy found in the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause. The first stage
continues, however, as two jurisdictions achieved legislative reform in 1993 (Nevada
and the District of Columbia), and state appellate courts in Kentucky and Texas have
recently invalidated sodomy laws using state constitutional theories. Commonwealth
v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993). However, during 1994 the highest courts of Louisiana and Mississippi
rejected state constitutional challenges to sodomy laws, although their decisions were
premised on lack of personal standing by the criminal defendants, who were accused
of public behavior, rather than on an ultimate rejection of the argument that the laws
might be unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual sex between adults. Miller
v. State, 636 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1994); State v. Baxley, 633 So.2d 142 (La. 1994).
2. For example, in City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957, a lesbian applicant
for a position as a police officer was denied the job on the basis of the Texas sodomy
law. Police officials asserted that a law enforcement agency should not be required to
hire someone who is a presumptive criminal. The court found the sodomy law uncon-
stitutional, and held that the police department could not rely on it for this purpose.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
approved a similar rationale for dismissing a suit by a lesbian denied a position as an
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tion," lesbians and gay men have sought protection against affirma-
tive discrimination that society accords to members of recognized
"minority groups." In this stage, the main vehicles are so-called
"gay rights" laws,' or litigation challenging discriminatory govern-
mental policies using constitutional theories.4 In the third stage,
which I call "Normalization," the movement fully engages the
problem of heterosexism. Heterosexism is a state of mind in which
heterosexuality, and the way heterosexuality leads to the structures
and institutions of people's lives, is assumed not only to be the
norm, but the only acceptable basis for social policy. 5 One of the
central goals of the third stage is societal acceptance and support
for the reality of lesbian and gay family structures as something to
be valued and reinforced, in the same way that society values and
reinforces heterosexually-based family structures.6
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). In Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), a Penn-
sylvania court deprived a lesbian mother of custody, asserting that her children might
be endangered if she were to travel through a state that penalized sodomy and were
to be arrested for committing the offense. The Virginia sodomy law was cited in Roe
v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985), as a public policy justification for denying child
custody to a gay man. The decision was illustrative of custody or visitation decisions
in jurisdictions with sodomy laws. E.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (denying custody petition of lesbian mother).
3. For a review of the current status of laws forbidding sexual orientation dis-
crimination, see Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: A Rapidly
Developing Field, 44 LAB. L.J. 574 (Sept. 1993); Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-
Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1905 (1993).
4. For example, numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging the Defense De-
partment's policy of excluding lesbians and gay men from military service. The most
significant pending suits are Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Defense
Department policy violates Equal Protection), motion for rehearing granted; Pruitt v.
Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 655 (1992) (Defense
Department policy may violate Equal Protection if Department cannot show a non-
discriminatory justification for it), trial pending; and Meinhold v. United States, -
F.3d -, 1994 WL 467311 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1994) (Department of Defense policy
should be construed so as to avoid discharge of gay sailor as to whom there was no
affirmative evidence of actual or desired homosexual conduct).
5. See Arthur S. Leonard, From Law: Homophobia, Heterosexism and Judicial
Decision Making, 1 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, No. 4, 65 (1991).
6. This ordering of stages in the struggle for lesbian and gay rights is a generaliza-
tion that does not necessarily hold true in all jurisdictions. While decriminalization
may precede the passage of civil rights laws, and achievement of civil rights laws may
precede normalization, peculiarities of local politics may vary the order. For example,
New York courts have accorded limited recognition to lesbian and gay families in the
absence of a state law forbidding sexual orientation discrimination. See, Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1992), even while a sodomy law is on the books
in New York, although the sodomy law was declared unenforceable against private,
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The first stage of the struggle is well-advanced in the United
States. Over the past thirty-five years, decriminalization has been
achieved in more than half of the states, constituting the over-
whelming majority of the country's residents.7 The second stage
has made less headway: state laws banning sexual orientation dis-
crimination have been enacted in fewer than one-fifth of the states,
although governmental policies and local legislation, viewed in
combination with the state laws, provide some form of protection
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation for a sub-
stantial portion of the population.8
The third stage is at even an earlier point of development. No
state allows same-sex couples to marry and obtain the immediate
benefits attached to full legal recognition of familial status,9 and
the public remains overwhelmingly opposed to same-sex mar-
riage. 10 Nevertheless, as this article will show, significant advances
have been made toward the acknowledgement of lesbian and gay
families as social structures worthy of social recognition and sup-
consensual adult sex in 1980, People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert.
denied sub nom. New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
7. Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Orientation Discrimination: A Growing Issue in
State and Local Law, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
193 (Bruno Stein, ed., 1993).
8. Id.
9. In Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1993), concurring Justice Sears-
Collins, agreeing that Georgia's live-in-lover statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b)
(1991 & Supp. 1994), should not be construed to deprive a former wife of alimony on
the ground that she was now living with a lesbian partner, catalogued the rights of
marital partners that are not accorded to same-sex couples because of their exclusion
from the right to marry, as follows:
These rights include the right to: a) file joint income tax returns; b) create a
marital life estate trust; c) claim estate tax marital deductions; d) claim fam-
ily partnership tax income; e) recover damages based on injury to a partner;
f) receive survivor's benefits; g) enter hospitals, jails and other places re-
stricted to "immediate family"; h) live in neighborhoods zoned "family
only"; i) obtain "family" health insurance, dental insurance, bereavement
leave and other employment benefits; j) collect unemployment benefits if
they quit their job to move with their partner to a new location because he
or she has obtained a new job; k) get residency status for a noncitizen part-
ner to avoid deportation; 1) automatically make medical decisions in the
event a partner is injured or incapacitated; m) and automatically inherit a
partner's property in the event he or she dies without a will. Many of the
other legal consequences of gay "coupling" are not so immediately apparent,
but surface only at times of stress - misunderstandings, separation and
death. 425 S.E.2d at 855 (footnote omitted).
10. See Poll: Majority Against Gay Marriages, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 8
(reporting a Newsweek poll showing that 62% of those polled opposed legally sanc-
tioned gay marriages, although 74% favored protecting gays from job bias and 81%
favored protecting gays from housing discrimination).
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port in a variety of contexts, and serious challenges to the marriage
citadel are ongoing.
The common link between cases in which courts or legislative
bodies have recognized lesbian and gay families is the willingness
to accept as a given the actual living arrangements of a particular
couple (with or without children) that is functioning effectively as a
family unit, represented by emotional and financial entanglement,
and further, to reinterpret or bend existing rules to accommodate
that reality. These courts have accepted the proposition, advanced
by New York State Appellate Division Justice Sidney H. Asch, that
"the best description of a family is a continuing relationship of love
and care, and an assumption of responsibility for some other
person."'"
II. Lesbian and Gay Marriage
The Normalization stage of the struggle for lesbian and gay
rights focuses on the problem of heterosexism, and the exclusion of
lesbian and gay couples from marriage is a prime example of heter-
osexism at work. Heterosexism is a form of "prejudice and antipa-
thy," as it is founded on a mentality that, shunning deviation from
the familiar or statistically "normal," underlies prejudice on the ba-
sis of race, the same mentality that equates "difference" with "in-
feriority." Lesbians and gay men should be able to count on the
courts to require governmental bodies to produce substantial, ob-
jective and non-discriminatory justifications for policies that ex-
clude them from participation in the basic institutions of our
society, such as the institution of marriage.
In the early flowering of lesbian and gay rights litigation in the
1970s, some gay people optimistically filed lawsuits seeking to com-
pel public authorities to let them marry their same-sex partners.
Decisions in these cases were issued by appellate courts in the
states of Kentucky,"2 Minnesota 13 and Washington. 14 In all of
them, the courts refused to order the government to award mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples. The arguments advanced by the
gay litigants were generally two-fold: 1) where marriage laws did
not specify in so many words that only opposite-sex couples could
11. In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (App. Div., 1982) (approv-
ing same-sex adult adoption petition).
12. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
13. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
14. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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marry, gay litigants asked the courts to interpret the laws to allow
same-sex couples to marry; and 2) where the first argument failed
or was not available, the plaintiffs argued that there was a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage.
A. Statutory Arguments
The first argument, that same sex marriages should be recog-
nized where not explicitly excluded, was not successful anywhere
because of the doctrines of legislative intent and plain meaning.
When a statute is capable of being given a variety of meanings
based on vague or general language, courts attempt to determine
the meaning most likely intended by the legislature, and for this
purpose will give words their "ordinary" or "everyday" meanings. 15
In the Minnesota case, for example, Justice C. Donald Peterson
rejected the argument that the state's apparently gender-neutral
marriage law could be interpreted to allow same-sex marriage.16
The judge commented "[it] is unrealistic to think that the original
draftsmen of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial
days, would have used the term in any different sense," and cited
contemporary dictionaries to support the court's determination
that marriage could only exist between a man and a woman.17
To the extent that one might find legislative history (committee
reports, legislative debates) to elucidate legislative intent, it is un-
likely that one could find any statements by legislators that they
intended to authorize same-sex marriages when they revised anti-
quated domestic relations laws by introducing gender neutral lan-
guage. If such statements had existed, the plaintiffs certainly would
have quoted them, but none of the appellate decisions from the
1970s indicate that any such evidence was presented. Whether on
the basis of legislative intent or plain meaning, the recognition of
same-sex marriage is difficult to obtain through interpretation of
existing laws.
B. Constitutional Arguments
The gay litigants of the 1970s were no more successful in arguing
for a constitutional right. They tried a variety of theories, but the
main lines of argument were that denial of same-sex marriage vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
15. See, e.g., A.J. Arave v. Creech, 113 S.Ct. 1534 (1993); INS v. Phinpahyha, 464
U.S. 183, 189 (1984); Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
16. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185, 186.
17. Id.
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depriving same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry, or
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by
discriminating against same-sex couples on the basis of gender or
sexual orientation.
The courts will normally uphold laws against Fourteenth
Amendment challenges if they find that there is a rational justifica-
tion for the laws, not based solely on prejudice against a particular
group. However, if the challenged laws affect a "fundamental
right," or discriminate on the basis of a classification that the courts
consider "suspect," the courts will require much more justification
for the law: the government's burden is to show that the law was
enacted to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it was care-
fully drafted to achieve that interest without unduly interfering
with constitutional rights. 18
1. Fundamental Right
In the context of marriage, a strong argument could be made
that a fundamental right is involved. In 1942, the Supreme Court
struck down an Oklahoma law that authorized sterilization of per-
sons with multiple convictions of crimes of "moral turpitude,"'19
stating that the legislation involved "one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exist-
ence and survival of the race. '20 In Loving v. Virginia,2' a 1967
decision invalidating a law that banned interracial marriages, the
Court reiterated that the right to marry "has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." Similarly, in a later case, the Court held
that prison authorities could not forbid a prisoner from marrying.22
However, when gay litigants later tried to rely on Loving v. Vir-
ginia for their fundamental right theory, they ran up against two
barriers: the fact that Loving did not involve same-sex marriage,
for which there was not a long tradition of societal recognition un-
derlying the determination that the right to marry was fundamen-
tal, and the tautological argument that the union of a same-sex
couple could not be a "marriage" because "marriage" was defined
as the union of an opposite-sex couple. As the Kentucky Court of
18. LAURENCE C. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-1 - 16-7, at
1436-1454 (2d ed. 1988).
19. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
20. Id. at 541.
21. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
22. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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Appeals stated in 1973, a marriage license could not be granted to
a same-sex couple "because what they propose is not a mar-
riage. "23 The courts found these arguments convincing.
2. Suspect Classification
Turning to the "suspect classification" branch of the Equal Pro-
tection argument, the plaintiffs were no more successful because
the courts refused to acknowledge that the marriage laws discrimi-
nated on the basis of sexual orientation. Implicitly making a point
that the Hawaii Supreme Court would later articulate in 1993, the
appellate courts of the 1970s found that the sexual orientation of
the plaintiffs was irrelevant; whether they were homosexual, heter-
osexual or bisexual, the state would not allow same-sex couples to
marry.24 The Washington Court of Appeals, disclaiming taking any
position on the question whether "homosexuals constitute a class
having characteristics making any legislative classification applica-
ble to them one having common denominators of suspectability,
25
asserted that the state had a rational basis for limiting access to
marriage to opposite-sex couples:
[Miarriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording
a favorable environment for the growth of children that we are
unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon which the
state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal
union of one man and one woman.26
The Supreme Court has never declared homosexuality or sexual
orientation to be a suspect classification. In the absence of a
Supreme Court ruling, a lower court must determine whether par-
ticular legislative discrimination is based on a suspect classification
by examining those factors that the Supreme Court has identified
as significant in making such a determination. Race is the quintes-
sential suspect class; the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment shows that in adopting this amendment the nation
was attempting to require the states to refrain from discriminating
against African Americans, recently liberated from slavery during
the Civil War. If a classification or characteristic is relevantly simi-
23. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1973).
24. The decisions of the 1970s are summarized in ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUAL-
ITY AND THE LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEGAL CASES 288-292 (1993)
[hereinafter SEXUALITY AND THE LAW].
25. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196, n. 12 (Wash. Ct. App., 1974).
26. Id. at 1197.
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lar to race, then it is likely to be found "suspect" for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause.27
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme
Court described how it determines whether a classification is sus-
pect.28 The Court said that race, alienage and national origin are
suspect because
[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considera-
tions are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy - a view
that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving
as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are
subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest ...29
The Court explained that legislative classifications based on gender
call for "a heightened standard of review" because "[t]hat factor
generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment";
therefore a "gender classification fails unless it is substantially re-
lated to a sufficiently important governmental interest."3 Classifi-
cations based on "illegitimacy" of birth are also subject to
"somewhat heightened scrutiny" because "illegitimacy is beyond
the individual's control and bears 'no relation to the individual's
ability to participate in and contribute to society.' ,,31
However, the Court explained, there is no "heightened review"
of classifications based on age, because "the aged... have not ex-
perienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. '32 In the dis-
pute before the Court in Cleburne over a special zoning law en-
acted to deter licensing of a group home for the mentally retarded,
the Court concluded that the law was not subject to heightened
scrutiny. However, the Court concluded that the law was moti-
vated entirely by fear of the mentally retarded, and thus failed the
normally deferential rationality test.33
27. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969).
28. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
29. Id. at 440.
30. Id. at 440-41.
31. Id. at 441.
32. Id.
33. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
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Is sexual orientation a suspect classification under this formula-
tion? In the 1970s marriage cases, the courts abstained from an-
swering the question by insisting that the laws did not discriminate
on that basis.34 In the context of continuing litigation over anti-gay
discrimination since that time, this has become one of the most bit-
terly argued points in lesbian and gay law.
For many lesbians and gay men, homosexuality is similar to race
in ways relevant to determining whether a classification is suspect.
It is a personal characteristic that gay people discover about them-
selves, rather than a conscious choice. Gay people tend to feel that
their sexuality is a basic part of who they are, not just a passing
whim or preference, and claims that sexual orientation can be
changed are not based on controlled, scientific study, but rather
anecdotal evidence of dubious provenance. Like race, homosexu-
ality has long been the basis for discriminatory treatment, even
though most gay people would likely contend that their sexual ori-
entation is irrelevant to their qualifications or ability to participate
in the activities from which they are being excluded. And, like Af-
rican-Americans at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
passed, gays have traditionally been at a severe disadvantage in se-
curing legislative policies favorable to them, due to intense social
prejudice fueled by entrenched religious teachings.3 5
Given all these factors, gay litigants have argued that discrimina-
tory governmental policies should be given heightened scrutiny.
Most courts disagree, partly because judges have rejected the at-
tempted analogy between homosexuality and race as fundamental
characteristics of personal identity. These judges embrace the view
of homosexuality that predates the mid-19th century identification
of the concept of sexual orientation; they view homosexuality as a
"behavior" in which any person might decide to engage or not to
engage, a "choice," and thus not deserving of special protection.36
34. See supra note 24.
35. The halting progress in the Nondiscrimination phase of the lesbian and gay
rights movement illustrates this point, a point emphasized by the recent success of the
anti-gay voter initiative movement.
36. For example, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Of-
fice, 895 F.2d 563, reh'g en banc denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1991), Judge Brunetti
wrote that "homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which
define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes." 895 F.2d at 573. Similarly,
in Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990), rejecting a suspect classification claim, Judge Archer wrote that "homo-
sexuality is primarily behavioral in nature." 871 F.2d at 1076. Reaching the same
conclusion from another direction, Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit accepted the
19941 935
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The same view of homosexuality seems implicit in the Supreme
Court's 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick decision, and is criticized in Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun's dissent in that case, which emphasizes that
the constitutional privacy doctrine protects such "choices" as deci-
sions about whom one selects as a sexual partner.37 Because the
Supreme Court held in Hardwick that the government could forbid
individuals from making the choice to engage in homosexual con-
duct, an identity predicated on the desire to engage in such conduct
could not possibly be the basis for a suspect classification, under
this line of reasoning.38
Additionally, some courts have pointed to the modest successes
of the second stage of the struggle for lesbian and gay rights and
proclaimed that gays do not lack political power and thus do not
need special protection by the courts under the Equal Protection
Clause.39 Under this reasoning, however, race should disappear as
a suspect classification for several reasons. First, federal, state and
local legislation outlawing race discrimination has become ubiqui-
tous. Second, the African-American caucus in Congress greatly
outnumbers the two openly gay men from liberal Massachusetts
who serve in the House of Representatives. 40 Finally, many of the
largest cities in the United States have elected black mayors over
the past two decades.
Adequate consideration of whether laws that discriminate
against lesbians and gay men merit heightened scrutiny would
harken to Justice Byron White's explanation in Cleburne of why
race, alienage and national origin classifications are suspect: these
are "factors which are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considera-
Defense Department's conceptualization of homosexuality, agreeing that a declara-
tion by an individual that she is a lesbian can rationally and reasonably be viewed as
reliable evidence of a desire and "propensity to engage in homosexual conduct."
BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990). Thus, homosexuality as an orientation or status does not exist apart from the
desire or "propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct, according to these judges.
37. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
38. This analysis of the Equal Protection issue was first explicitly adopted in
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), by Judge Silberman, who stated that
"[it] would be anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states
may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause." Id. at 103.
39. The Seventh Circuit in BenShalom, 881 F.2d 464, for example, found that gays
did not lack political power because, inter alia, the mayor of Chicago had recently
participated in a "gay rights parade" in that city. Id. at 465, n. 9.
40. It is significant that neither of the representatives was openly gay when first
elected.
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tions are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."41 This seems
like an accurate description of the factor of sexual orientation,
when viewed apart from the issue of regulating sexual behavior.
C. State Constitutional Arguments
Apart from the Fourteenth Amendment arguments, one of the
1970s courts also faced a significant state law argument. In Singer
v. Hara, the plaintiff pointed to the state constitution's Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), forbidding sex discrimination, that
Washington State voters had recently adopted, and argued that de-
nying a marriage license to a same-sex couple was sex discrimina-
tion, just as denying a marriage license to a mixed-race couple had
been found by the Supreme Court to be race discrimination in
Loving v. Virginia.42
The argument did not impress the Washington court, which ex-
plained that under the ERA "laws which differentiate between the
sexes are permissible so long as they are based upon the unique
physical characteristics of a particular sex, rather than upon a per-
son's membership in a particular sex per se.' '43 Judge Swanson
wrote for the court that the state's rationale for limiting marriage
to opposite-sex couples was "based upon the state's recognition
that our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children."'
Since "no same-sex couple offers the possibility of birth of children
by their union," the state's definition of marriage as a union of a
man and a woman was based on "the physical characteristics of the
sexes," and not on unlawful discrimination offensive to the ERA.45
D. Recent Litigation
All of the legal challenges seeking same-sex marriage during the
1970s failed, and lesbian and gay legal groups did not pursue the
issue further at that time. The issue burst into prominence again
during the late 1980s, probably as a result of several converging
phenomena: increasing numbers of lesbians and gay men were
raising children together as couples; the AIDS epidemic was dem-
onstrating to many people that the lack of legally recognized family
41. BenShalom, 881 F.2d at 463, quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
42. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
43. Id. at 1194.
44. Id. at 1195.
45. Id.
1994]
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structures was harmful in the context of illness and death;46 and the
claims of Normalization were pressing more strongly as progress in
obtaining civil rights protection encouraged more lesbians and gay
men to live together openly. For instance, a new push for same-sex
marriage got a big boost from the 1987 March on Washington for
lesbian and gay rights, when a giant mock marriage ceremony was
staged on the steps of the Internal Revenue Service headquarters.47
Although gay movement legal organizations had come to a general
agreement to avoid instigating same-sex marriage litigation, indi-
viduals across the country were determined to push the issue for-
ward. Test cases were filed in the District of Columbia and the
state of Hawaii. Both were unsuccessful at the trial level.
1. The Washington D.C. Case
In Washington, D.C., the two gay male litigants, Craig Dean and
Patrick Gill, avoided the federal constitutional arguments that had
proven unpersuasive in the 1970s marriage cases. Instead, their
case was based primarily on two arguments: that the gender-neu-
tral District marriage law should be construed to allow same-sex
marriages, and that a District ordinance banning sexual orientation
discrimination in public services applied to the city's marriage li-
cense bureau.8 At trial, this turned into arguments over whether
an ordinance that uses the term "marriage" could possibly be con-
strued to extend to same-sex relationships, and whether the city
council had intended its ordinance to apply to the marriage bureau.
The plaintiffs submitted extensive documentation, including
some ancient historical sources,49 to show that the concept of mar-
46. Among the contexts in which the lack of legal family recognition became sig-
nificant in the AIDS epidemic were: lack of inclusion of people with AIDS in their
same-sex partners' employment-based health insurance coverage; disputes with land-
lords over whether the same-sex survivors of persons with AIDS could succeed to the
tenancy of their deceased partners' apartments; battles over inheritance rights when
people with AIDS died without making wills, or even when they made wills, tradi-
tional family members would challenge the wills on the basis of undue influence or
incapacity; problems with hospitals that would not recognize the same-sex partner as
a family member for purposes of access and involvement in treatment information
and decision-making.
47. Linda Wheeler, 2,000 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in Ceremony of Rights,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1987, at B1.
48. Dean & Gill v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1141 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1991), denying motion for reconsideration, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1387
(D.C. Superior Ct., 1992), appeal pending.
49. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE (1994).
Professor Boswell submitted an affidavit in Dean & Gill summarizing his research.
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riage had been applied to same-sex couples." Additionally, the
plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence that the city council did
not contemplate excepting any city agencies from the requirement
of non-discrimination. Nevertheless, Superior Court Judge Shellie
Bowers ruled against them and ordered the case dismissed. In sup-
port of his decision, the judge cited Biblical passages for the propo-
sition that the institution of marriage had from earliest times been
conceived as a union of man and woman, and dismissed the argu-
ment that the District Council intended to apply its non-discrimina-
tion ordinance to the marriage license bureau.5 1 An appeal was
argued to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on November
1, 1993.52
2. The Hawaii Case
The Hawaii case was a test case brought by a group of same-sex
couples. Without a trial and in an unpublished opinion, Circuit
Court Judge Robert Klein granted the state's motion to dismiss.5 3
Judge Klein found that excluding same-sex couples from marrying
did not violate their right of privacy under the Hawaii constitution,
which he found accorded no greater rights on this score than the
federal constitution. He also found no equal protection violation
because homosexuality was not, in his opinion, a suspect classifica-
tion for purposes of Hawaii constitutional law. Finally, he con-
cluded that the marriage law "is obviously designed to promote the
general welfare interests of the community by sanctioning tradi-
tional man-woman family units and procreation. '54
On appeal, the plaintiffs achieved an historic breakthrough by
persuading the Hawaii Supreme Court that the ban on same-sex
marriage required heightened judicial scrutiny.55 Ironically, how-
ever, the Hawaii court agreed with the 1970s courts that had con-
cluded that the ban on same-sex marriage did not discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, since same-sex marriage was pro-
hibited regardless of the sexual orientation of the participants. 6
50. Dean & Gill, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1142.
51. Id.
52. Elizabeth Schwinn, Court Ruling Could Open Door to Gay Marriages in Capi-
tal, Hous. CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 1993, at 8.
53. Baehr v. Lewin (Hawaii Circuit Court, Klein, J., Sept. 3, 1991). The unpub-
lished decision is discussed and quoted in 1991 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 65-66.
54. Id. at 66.
55. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
56. Id. at 58. The Hawaii court rejected the argument that excluding same-sex
couples from marriage violated their right of privacy, finding that Hawaii's constitu-
tional right of privacy went no further than the federal privacy right, which the court
19941
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
Rather, the Hawaii court found that the ban discriminated on the
basis of sex, potentially in violation of the express ban on sex dis-
crimination found in the Hawaii constitution. Unlike the earlier
courts that had rejected the analogy to Loving v. Virginia, the Ha-
waii court found the analogy persuasive. In Loving, the state ar-
gued that because both black and white people were equally
forbidden from marrying persons of the other race, the state had
not discriminated on the basis of race but had imposed the same
disability, evenhandedly, on persons of both races. 7 The Supreme
Court, rejecting this argument, held in Loving that by using race to
classify people under the marriage law, the state had discriminated
on the basis of race because the state's motivation was to preserve
the "purity" of the white race.5 8
Following the same logic, the Hawaii court said that one could
lift the key language from the Loving opinion, substitute the word
"sex" for the word "race," and come to the same conclusion. 9
Although the state had equally forbidden men from marrying men
and women from marrying women, it had nonetheless discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex by using the sex of an individual to deter-
mine whether that person could marry another person. Deciding a
question of first impression under the Hawaii Constitution, the
court held that if sex is used as a basis of classification under the
statute, then the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny because
the Hawaii Constitution only allows sex to be used as a classifying
principle when it is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.6 °
The case is now awaiting trial on the merits, with the issue being
whether the Hawaii classification serves a compelling state interest.
Prior courts considering the issue of same-sex marriage have al-
ways found that the exclusionary policy is justified by the state's
desire to preserve marriage as a sanctuary for procreation and
child-rearing, and this justification was always considered sufficient
under a rationality standard.61 Whether it will stand up to the re-
quirements of strict scrutiny, under which a policy must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest without unduly
characterized as having been held in Bowers v. Hardwick not to protect homosexual
relationships. 852 P.2d at 55. But see, Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp. 859 (N.D.Ga.
1993), appeal pending. (gay relationships protected by right of intimate association).
57. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
58. Id.
59. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
60. Id. at 67.
61. See cases cited in supra II.B.
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burdening constitutional protections, is a matter for some specula-
tion. It can be plausibly argued that excluding same-sex couples
from marriage is not necessary to achieve the state's interest, and
may be counterproductive in light of the many same-sex couples
who are raising children and for whom obtaining the benefits of
marriage will assist their children in the same way that those bene-
fits assist the children of opposite-sex couples. Under strict scru-
tiny, there must be a "tight fit" between the state's legitimate
policy goals and the statutory scheme it adopts;62 this requirement
is unlikely to be met by a statute limiting access to marriage to
opposite-sex couples.
If the Hawaii or District of Columbia plaintiffs are successful in
obtaining a judicial ruling that the state must issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, the possibility remains that the peo-
ple of Hawaii or the District of Columbia Council will vote to over-
rule their highest courts. The Hawaii court's 1993 decision was
followed by the passage of legislation opposing same-sex mar-
riage,63 but the constitutional basis for the decision makes it likely
that a constitutional amendment would be needed to overrule any
final judicial determination. In the District of Columbia, were the
Court of Appeals to overrule the superior court and remand the
matter for trial based on interpretation of the District's marriage
law or human rights law, the Council could amend the laws to
avoid the court's interpretation. Moreover, Congress, which re-
tains ultimate legislative authority over the District, could enact
legislation overruling the court.
3. Full Faith and Credit
When married people cross state lines, they usually do not ques-
tion whether their marriage in one state will be considered valid in
the next, and nobody entering a valid marriage ceremony expects
to encounter difficulties when they file a joint federal income tax
return or apply for spousal benefits under the Social Security Act.
If certain jurisdictions, such as Washington, D.C. and Hawaii, even-
tually allow same-sex couples to marry, public officials and courts
in other states, and various agencies of the federal government
(such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Admin-
istration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service), will
62. See TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 16-5 to -13, at 1451-66.
63. 1994 HAW. SESS. LAWS 217.
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have to determine whether those marriages are entitled to recogni-
tion beyond the geographical confines of those jurisdictions.
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution requires that each
state give "full faith and credit... to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings in every other State. ' 64 Federal law dictates
that every court in the nation must give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings and acts of the legislatures "of any State, Terri-
tory, or Possession of the United States. '65
The Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit
clause does not always require a state to give full and preclusive
effect to everything a neighboring state does; the state court that is
asked to give full faith and credit to a legal proceeding or instru-
ment from another state may determine whether an important
state policy might be violated by so doing.66 In the matter of mar-
riage, it is the normal rule that states do give full faith and credit to
marriages that were lawfully contracted in other states.67 This is
most vividly illustrated in the case of common law marriage, which
has been statutorily abolished in many states, including New York.
In New York the courts will nonetheless recognize common law
marriages between New York residents if those common law mar-
riages were validly entered into in a state that recognizes them. 68
One problem, of course, is that according to the 1970s same-sex
marriage decisions, a marriage between persons of the same sex is,
by judicial and statutory definition, not a marriage. It seems likely
that courts asked to recognize same-sex marriages obtained in
other jurisdictions might well take the view that there is "nothing
to recognize" because, whatever that other jurisdiction may have
sanctioned, it is not a "marriage." If a court determines that it
would violate the policies of the state to recognize a same-sex mar-
riage contracted in another state, it seems unlikely that the court
would hold that the state is nonetheless required to recognize the
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). A full discussion of the application of this law to
federal and state agencies and courts is beyond the scope of this article.
66. See Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
67. See, e.g., Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1980).
68. Id. See also Ram v. Ramharack, 150 Misc.2d 1009, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct.
1991). For some examples of court decisions holding that full faith and credit will be
accorded common law marriages entered into in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Ander-
son v. Anderson, 577 So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1991); Estate of Hendrickson, 805 P.2d 20
(Kan. 1991); Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049 (N.M.App. 1990), cert. denied, 797
P.2d 983 (N.M. 1990); Hager v. Hager, 349 S.E.2d 908 (Va. App. 1986); Peffley-
Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989); Estate of Foster, 376 S.E.2d 144 (W.
Va. 1988).
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same-sex marriage under the Full Faith and Credit clause. But this
result is by no means compelled.69
Whether federal agencies would have to respect a same-sex mar-
riage that is valid under state law has been addressed in Adams v.
Howerton,7 ° in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) refused to recognize a same-sex marriage contracted be-
tween a U.S. citizen and an Australian citizen in Boulder, Colo-
rado. The county clerk in Boulder issued two men a marriage
license and they had a wedding performed by a local minister.71
Press coverage led a member of the state legislature to request an
opinion from the state's attorney general as to the validity of the
marriage. The attorney general, in an informal opinion, said that
the marriage was not valid under state law.72 The INS refused to
treat the Australian as the lawful spouse of an American citizen
and threatened deportation.
Ruling on Adams' claim that the INS was bound to recognize a
lawful Colorado marriage, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Congress intended for the INS to determine whether a mar-
riage was valid for purposes of federal law, and that the validity of
the marriage under state law was not controlling, assuming that
Colorado would consider this marriage to be valid.73 Furthermore,
applying the "plain meaning" rule to the undefined term "spouse"
in the statute, Circuit Judge Wallace found that the common mean-
ing of that term referred to opposite-sex couples only.74 In a subse-
quent decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld the INS's determination
that the couple was not entitled to a waiver of deportation under
an extreme hardship exception.75 Subsequently, Australia changed
its immigration policies to permit the emigration of same-sex part-
ners of Australian citizens, making it possible for this couple to live
together in that country.76
69. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court's intermediate opinion in Baehr en-
tertained no doubts that a same-sex marriage could be a "marriage" within the mean-
ing of Hawaii's marriage laws.
70. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
71. Id. at 1038.
72. Id. at 1039.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1040.
75. Sullivan v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 772 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. Marianne MacDonald, Gay Immigration Officer Forged Passport, THE IN-
DEPENDENT, April 27, 1994, at 6. MacDonald reports that the following countries
now recognize same-sex couples for this purpose: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. For more information on the impact of
immigration policies on homosexual couples, see Kim Heinrich, Reunion of Gay
Couple Thwarted, VANCOUVER SUN, June 26, 1992, at B6; Jonathan Mandell, Ban of
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If Adams v. Howerton is followed as precedent, same-sex mar-
riages authorized under state law will probably not be seen as bind-
ing on federal agencies. Assuming that the Full Faith and Credit
clause does not operate as a restriction on the legislative or execu-
tive branches of the federal government, the result in Adams seems
correct as a matter of federal law, although Adams would be read-
ily distinguishable from a case in which there was no doubt about
the validity of the same-sex marriage in the state where it was law-
fully contracted.
III. Non-Marital Recognition of Same-Sex Families
Seeking same-sex marriage is not a universal goal in the lesbian
and gay rights movement. When lesbian and gay legal organiza-
tions decided during the 1980s not to pursue gay marriage litiga-
tion, the decision was fueled in part by the argument that marriage
was a patriarchal institution, rooted in heterosexual tradition and
male privilege, and to be avoided by the sexually egalitarian les-
bian and gay rights movement. Many argued that lesbians and gay
men, as social pioneers, were in a position to structure new, equita-
ble arrangements suitable for same-sex couples unburdened by the
historical baggage of traditional marriage. For those holding this
view, the appropriate course was to seek legal recognition for non-
marital alternatives to the traditional marital family in each context
where the law places importance on a family connection. This part
of the article will describe a variety of contexts in which such
claims have been raised.
A. Housing Rights
One of the first appellate decisions to recognize a same-sex
couple as a family unit was Braschi v. Stahl Associates, a 1989 deci-
sion by the New York Court of Appeals."
Miguel Braschi and Leslie Blanchard, both gay men, had lived
together in Blanchard's rent-controlled apartment in New York
City as a couple for many years.78 After Blanchard died from
Matrimony: Gay Immigrants Can't Say 'I Do' or 'I Swear,' NEWSDAY, June 13, 1994,
at A12.
77. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). See SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at
364-367, for a more complete discussion of this case. See generally Paris R. Baldacci,
Pushing the Law to Encompass the Reality of Our Families: Protecting Lesbian and
Gay Families from Eviction from their Homes-Braschi's Functional Definition of
"Family" and Beyond, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. - (1994).
78. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 50-51.
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AIDS, the landlord threatened Braschi with eviction.79 Braschi
brought an action seeking protection under a rent control regula-
tion that prohibited the eviction of a surviving family member who
resided in a rent-controlled apartment when the tenant of record
died.80
Justice Harold Baer, Jr. ruled in an unpublished opinion that the
relationship between Braschi and Blanchard "fulfills any defini-
tional criteria of the term 'family,' " which was undefined in the
regulation, and that they "were economically, socially and physi-
cally a couple like any traditional couple except their relationship
could not be legally consummated." 81
The Appellate Division reversed in a brief per curiam opinion,
finding that the undefined term "family" should be construed in
accord with legislative intent, and that there was no indication that
the legislature "was also including and granting legal status and
recognition to nontraditional family relationships" when it in-
cluded protection for surviving family members in the rent control
code.82 The court found that since the regulation was in derogation
of common law property rights of the landlord, it should be strictly
construed.83
Braschi appealed, arguing that excluding him from the protec-
tion of the regulation violated equal protection as well as the com-
mon sense meaning of the regulation. The Court of Appeals
avoided the constitutional question by agreeing with Justice Baer
that the regulation should be broadly construed to achieve its over-
arching purpose of preventing evictions of family members upon
the death of a rent-controlled tenant. In a plurality opinion, Judge
Vito Titone wrote:
[F]amily... should not be rigidly restricted to those people who
have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a
marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protec-
tion against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal
distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foun-
dation in the reality of family life.84
Interestingly, Judge Titone's opinion does not focus on the gen-
ders of Blanchard and Braschi. Because Blanchard's first name,
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id.
81. SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 365.
82. Stahl Associates Co. v. Braschi, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 1988).
83. Id. at 45.
84. 74 N.Y.2d at 211.
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Leslie, could belong to a person of either gender, one could read
the plurality opinion without concluding that the case even in-
volved a same-sex couple, apart from one footnote reference to
homosexuals. Indeed, in subsequent litigation it became clear that
the opinion did not apply only to same-sex couples, as courts ap-
plied its rationale to a variety of non-traditional family units.8 5
This helped to make the decision broadly acceptable, leading the
State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, the agency
responsible for promulgating rent regulations, to codify the deci-
sion and extend it from the relatively small rent controlled sector
to the much larger rent stabilized sector of the New York rental
housing market, an action subsequently upheld by the Court of
Appeals as an appropriate exercise of administrative discretion. 86
B. Guardianship for a Partner With Diminished Capacity
In an important recognition of a same-sex couple as a family, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a trial court should have
acknowledged the same-sex relationship of a woman who had been
severely disabled in an automobile accident by appointing her part-
ner to be her legal guardian.87
Sharon Kowalski, who had lived in a same-sex relationship with
Karen Thompson for four years, was seriously brain-damaged and
paralyzed as a result of an automobile accident.88 At first she
could not clearly communicate her own wishes. Kowalski and
Thompson had not executed any formal documents signifying their
relationship (such as a partnership agreement, joint wills or powers
of attorney, living wills or health care proxies), and had not in-
formed Kowalski's parents or siblings about the nature of their re-
lationship.89 When Thompson told Kowalski's parents about the
nature of the relationship, they eventually moved to exclude
Thompson from contact with Sharon. The father, Donald Kowal-
ski, sought and obtained appointment as Sharon's guardian, with
85. See, e.g., 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 547 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1989)
(finding parent-child relationship between tenant and unrelated son of woman who
was boarding in tenant's apartment); Batsikas v. Ligouri, 567 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1991) (finding great-nephew has succession rights to great-aunt's apartment,
despite lack of blood relation).
86. Rent Stabilization Association v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 629 (N.Y. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2693 (1994).
87. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review
denied, Feb. 10, 1992. For a more detailed treatment of this case, see SEXUALITY AND
THE LAW, supra note 24, at 377-382.
88. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791.
89. Id.
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the right to control who would have access to her.9" Thompson
instituted litigation seeking access to her partner, but was repeat-
edly rebuffed by the Minnesota courts.91
Thompson decided to publicize her legal struggle, and obtained
national support for her campaign to restore contact with her part-
ner.92 Finally, worn down by the prolonged litigation and un-
wanted media attention, and responding to a decision by District
Judge Robert V. Campbell to order a new medical evaluation of
Sharon to determine whether she was capable of expressing her
wishes as to guardianship, Donald Kowalski signalled his willing-
ness late in 1988 to relinquish the guardianship. Thompson filed a
new guardianship petition, and Judge Campbell scheduled a hear-
ing. Although Thompson's petition was unopposed, a friend of the
Kowalskis, Karen Tomberlin, wrote to the attorney appointed by
the court to represent Sharon's interests and suggested herself as a
new "neutral" guardian who could mediate between the Kowalski
family and Thompson.93 Although all the professional opinion of-
fered at the hearing supported awarding the guardianship to
Thompson, Campbell decided to appoint Tomberlin, and Thomp-
son appealed.94
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Jack Davies refuted every
finding and ruling made by Campbell, including the preference for
a "neutral" guardian.95 After reviewing the lengthy trial record,
which supported finding that Sharon could and did express a pref-
erence to have Thompson as her guardian and that such an ap-
pointment would be in Sharon's best interest, Judge Davies
concluded that Campbell had abused his discretion by appointing
Tomberlin.96 Finally, and without any further explanation, Judge
Davies asserted that the choice of Thompson as guardian "is fur-
ther supported by the fact that Thompson and Sharon are a family
of affinity, which ought to be accorded respect." 97
Karen Thompson's battle to be reunited with her partner and to
establish a legal family tie with her through appointment as her
90. Id. at 791.
91. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 392 N.W.2d 310 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
92. See SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 379.
93. Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 792.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 792-96.
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id.
1994] 947
948 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI
guardian took eight years from the time of the accident until the
Minnesota Supreme Court's refusal to review the court of appeals'
decision.98 Thompson and Kowalski had become a symbol of the
struggles encountered by same-sex couples in times of adversity,
and were cited by lesbian and gay attorneys to their clients as ob-
ject lessons about the consequences of avoiding "coming out" to
family members and execution of documents that could evidence
the nature of a relationship. The final decision of the court, how-
ever, provides an important precedent for the proposition that a
"family of affinity" should be respected when a judge with equita-
ble powers is called upon to make an appointment of this kind.99
C. Same-Sex Adult Adoption
Given the lack of widespread popular support for the idea of
same-sex marriage, it seems unlikely that legislatures will be au-
thorizing such marriages anytime soon. An alternative mechanism
for establishing legal family ties between adults of the same sex
might be available through the mechanism of adoption. In 1993,
the Delaware Supreme Court became the first high appellate court
to approve an adult adoption in the context of a gay relationship, in
In re Adoption of Swanson.1"
This sort of adoption first became a significant issue in litigation
in New York City during the early 1980s arising out of the tight
rental housing market. Under the rent regulation system in New
York, residential rents were kept far below market rates. Land-
lords had a strong incentive to find lease violations as a basis for
evicting tenants because eviction under the regulations allowed
landlords an extra rent increase from a new tenant. 10 1 The stan-
dard form lease used by the landlords had a provision restricting
occupancy to the tenant and members of the tenant's family, who
98. See SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 382.
99. In August, 1994, the California legislature approved a bill, Assembly Bill No.
2810, that would establish a domestic partnership registry and extend recognition to
registered partners on the same basis as spouses for the following purposes: (1) joint
liability for debts for household expenses, (2) visitation rights in hospitals, (3) partici-
pation in conservatorship proceedings (including priority for appointment as a conser-
vator for a registered partner), (4) inclusion of registered partners as a potential
beneficiary on the standard California wills form set out in the Probate Code for
those who want to make a simple will. Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the bill, assert-
ing that its provisions were not necessary. Greg Lucas, Governor Vetoes Bill on Do-
mestic Pairs, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Sept. 12, 1994, at Al.
100. 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993). "Swanson" is a pseudonym adopted by the court
to protect the confidentiality of the parties.
101. See SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 326-332.
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were defined as legal relatives. Landlords brought actions to ter-
minate leases and evict tenants when they discovered that the ten-
ants were living with unrelated "roommates." Many of these
actions were filed against gay tenants who invited their lovers to
move in with them.
At the same time, seeking to realize some cash from their invest-
ments, many landlords during the early 1980s sought to convert
their buildings into cooperatives by selling shares in the building to
the tenants. The typical cooperative offering plan restricted the of-
fer to tenants in residence and their family members. Therefore,
gay tenants and their partners could not jointly take advantage of
the offers to purchase the apartments in which they lived. Gay ten-
ants sought to avoid these problems by adopting their partners, and
met with mixed success in the lower courts in having their petitions
approved.102
One unsuccessful couple, Jack Mitchell and Robert Paul Pavlik,
appealed the denial of their petition to the Court of Appeals,
which ruled in 1984 that the adoption statute could not be used for
this purpose. 1 3 "Our adoption statute embodies the fundamental
social concept that the relationship of parent and child may be es-
tablished by operation of law," wrote Judge Matthew Jasen, hold-
ing that the New York adoption laws "reflect the general
acceptance of the ancient principle of adoptio naturam imitatur,"
i.e., that adoption imitates nature in creating a parent-child rela-
tionship where none had previously existed.0 4 To Judge Jasen,
such a concept could not be reconciled with the use of adoption as
a "quasi-matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with
a legal imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual
or homosexual."'01 5 Judge Jasen had missed the point of the pro-
ceeding, which was not to sanction a sexual relationship, but rather
to gain legal recognition of the reality of a family unit. Judge Jasen
opined that it would be "utterly repugnant to the relationship be-
tween child and parent in our society" to approve an adoption
where a sexual relationship between the child and the parent was
the basis for the relationship. 0 6 In addition, the case was not
102. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984); In re Adult
Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 1982); In re Adult Anonymous, 435
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fam. Ct. 1981). For a more detailed treatment of these cases, see SEXU-
ALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 326-332.
103. In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
104. Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d at 425.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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helped by the prospective adoptive parent being younger than the
prospective adoptive child, given the court's insistence that the
statute meant to replicate a "natural" family.
The decision in Robert Paul P. did not put a halt to same-sex gay
adult adoptions in New York. However, judging by informal re-
ports received by this writer from attorneys in the field, the incen-
tive for gay adult adoptions was sharply reduced when the
legislature amended the Real Property Law to require landlords to
allow tenants to have unrelated roommates. 10 7 The legislative ac-
tion came in response to a decision by the Court of Appeals en-
forcing a families-only lease provision against a woman tenant and
her male lover in 1983,108 which generated the necessary political
coalition between tenants' rights groups and lesbian and gay
groups to achieve legislative reform.
But there are other reasons why gay people might want to adopt
their partners. Establishing legal family ties might lessen the abil-
ity of estranged blood family members to contest testamentary dis-
positions, could avoid the problems encountered by Kowalski and
Thompson, and would be beneficial for estate tax purposes. Hop-
ing to benefit their estate planning, a gay couple decided to pursue
the possibility of adoption in Delaware, but was unsuccessful in the
family court, which held in an unpublished opinion that the Dela-
ware adoption statute, like New York's, intended to imitate nature
and did not authorize a same-sex adult adoption for the purposes
contemplated by the petitioner. 1 9
The Delaware Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding
that the Delaware statute, on its face, posed only limited technical
requirements for prospective adult adoptions, which were met by
the petitioner.110 Indeed, the court found that the various estate
planning considerations motivating the parties were well-founded
in the history of adult adoption, which dated back to ancient times
as a device for a childless person of means to establish a family line
through the adoption of a favored younger friend."1
Unlike New York, Delaware had not included in its adoption
statute a requirement for the court to make a finding about the
"best interest of the child" as a prerequisite for an adult adoption,
107. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 1989).
108. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983).
109. In re the Adoption of John A.S., No. 91-09-02-A, 1992 WL 361416 (Del. Fain.
Ct. Oct. 5, 1992).
110. Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095.
111. Id. at 1098.
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tending to negate the contention that an adoption could be used
only to establish a parent-child relationship in imitation of nature.
But even if Delaware's statute were not so readily distinguishable
from New York's, it appears that the court might have reached the
same result, because Justice Moore, writing for the unanimous
court, apparently found New York Judge Jasen's opinion unpersua-
sive, and noted "the compelling dissent in... Robert Paul P....,
taking the majority to task for imposing limitations on the process
that are not found in New York's adult adoption statute.' '1 12
While there are no reports of a rush to adopt among lesbian and
gay Delawareans, or a massive movement of gay people into that
state for that purpose, the court's decision provides an interesting
precedent for extending legal recognition to a same-sex relation-
ship outside the context of marriage.
D. Employment Benefits
Another area where the struggle for recognition of same-sex
families has made notable progress is in the obtaining of employ-
ment benefits. Employee benefit plans, which represent a signifi-
cant portion of employee compensation, typically predicate
eligibility for certain benefits on recognition of family status. For
example, a health benefit plan may extend eligibility to the spouse,
children or other dependent family members of an employee,
either at the employer's cost or with a contributory payment by the
employee. Employers may provide death benefits to surviving
spouses or children of employees, and usually have bereavement
leave policies that authorize paid time off on the death of a spouse
or member of the spouse's immediate biological family (e.g., par-
ents or siblings). In addition, employers may authorize use of sick
leave or family leave to care for an ailing spouse or child. If em-
ployers do not recognize the non-marital domestic partners (and
children of non-marital partners) of their employees as family
members, those employees receive less compensation than their
married colleagues for performing the same work. They also may
suffer significant financial pressure if their partners (and partner's
children) are not otherwise covered by an employee benefits plan.
Progress on this issue in the private sector has to be voluntary on
the part of employers. The federal government has neither legis-
lated to mandate or authorize the recognition of domestic partners
under employee benefit plans, nor generally forbidden employ-
112. Id.
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ment discrimination on the basis of marital status or sexual
orientation." 3
In addition, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)" 4 preempts state and local governments from at-
tempting to regulate employee benefits," 5 thus precluding them
from either directly requiring private employers to recognize em-
ployee domestic partners or indirectly requiring such recognition
through the enforcement of general antidiscrimination statutes." 6
However, ERISA does not preempt states from regulating the
practices of insurance companies," 7 so states could theoretically
legislate to require insurance companies to include domestic part-
nership recognition in the group insurance products they offer to
employers, although no states have yet done so. Indeed, state in-
surance regulations might prove a stumbling block if they do not
provide insurance companies with the flexibility to develop group
policies that recognize domestic partnership families.
Many large employers now provide health benefits through a
mechanism called self-insurance. Rather than purchasing a group
policy from an insurance company, the employer will directly pay
the medical expenses of employees and dependents covered by the
plan, although an employer may hire an insurance company to act
as an administrator for the employer's group. By adopting self-
insurance, the employer effectively escapes indirect state regula-
tion of its employee health plan, and is free to define the scope and
coverage of the plan without state interference. Such employers
may be more free to adopt domestic partnership benefit plans,
113. Federal regulation intrudes in this sphere in another sense, however, since fed-
eral tax laws adopt a traditional definition of the family in dealing with the taxability
and deductibility of employee health benefits. Employers may deduct as a business
expense the cost of providing health insurance to employees and their family depen-
dents (as defined by federal law), and employees may exclude from their taxable in-
come the value of such benefits. 26 U.S.C. § 106 (1989). This preferential tax
treatment is not necessarily available for domestic partnership benefits, in the absence
of proof that the partner is economically dependent on the employee. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
92-31-062 (May 7, 1992).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
116. This preemption problem would not be solved by passage of the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1994 ("ENDA"), introduced in Congress on June 23, 1994.
S. 2238, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994). Although ENDA would ban sexual
orientation discrimination in employment by those employers large enough to be cov-
ered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2005f, Section 4
of ENDA specifically provides: "This Act does not apply to the provision of employee
benefits to an individual for the benefit of his or her partner." Consequently, ERISA
preemption would theoretically not be affected by passage of ENDA.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (1974).
LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES
since they need not be concerned with whether an insurance com-
pany is willing to sell them an appropriate plan.
As a result, private sector employers that have granted such rec-
ognition have done so either through collective bargaining with un-
ions, or by voluntary agreement in response to requests from
individuals or groups of employees. Among the first employers to
establish a domestic partnership benefits plan was The Village
Voice, a weekly newspaper in New York City, as part of a collective
bargaining agreement with the Newspaper Guild, a union repre-
senting its editorial and clerical staff. Most recently, unions repre-
senting attorneys at the Legal Aid Society of New York and Legal
Services for New York City have achieved collective bargaining
agreements providing domestic partnership recognition and bene-
fits. Several large employers-most notably in the computer serv-
ices and entertainment industries and in higher education-have
voluntarily extended their employee benefits plans to recognize
domestic partnership families. 118
The possibility that voluntary adoption of a non-discrimination
policy covering sexual orientation might require an employer to
recognize domestic partnership families was confirmed in Griev-
ance of B.M., S.S., C.M. and J.R.,"a9 in which the Vermont Labor
Relations Board found merit in a grievance filed by employees of
the University of Vermont protesting the university's failure to
provide such benefits. The university argued that because it ex-
cludes unmarried heterosexual partners from benefits eligibility,
the exclusion of unmarried gay couples did not constitute sexual
orientation discrimination. The Board decided that it could use a
disparate impact analysis; because gay couples cannot marry in
Vermont, they are disproportionately affected by the limitation of
eligibility to traditional marriage families, so the limitation was
found to violate the non-discrimination policy.' 20 Because the uni-
versity is a public employer, the Board did not have to concern
itself with ERISA preemption, which might stand in the way of an
attempt to require a private sector employer to extend benefits
based on a voluntarily adopted non-discrimination policy. In the
case of a private sector employer, however, ERISA preemption
118. Jennifer Steinhauer, Increasingly, Employers Offer Benefits to All Partners,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994, at B1; Jay Mathews, Gay Partners Gain Benefits, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at Al.
119. No. 92-32 (Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd., June 4, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
120. Id.
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would not be a problem if the non-discrimination policy was iter-
ated in the actual plan documents.12 '
In the public sector, where ERISA preemption is not a con-
cern, 122 employees have sued with limited success to establish that
their same-sex partners are entitled to coverage under group health
plans that cover family members of employees, using constitutional
theories of equal protection and statutory theories based on state
or local ordinances forbidding marital status or sexual orientation
discrimination. 123 In some municipalities, employee groups allied
with lesbian and gay political organizations in coalition with other
organizations, such as public sector labor unions, have been suc-
cessful in encouraging passage of ordinances extending benefits eli-
gibility to the unmarried partners of city employees.2 4 On a
121. In Rovira v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 817 F. Supp. 1062
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), the surviving same-sex domestic partner of an AT&T employee
claimed a survivor's death benefit. The company's employee benefit plan limited eli-
gibility for such benefits to spouses and children of the employee. The company had
adopted a non-discrimination policy in its personnel manual that included sexual ori-
entation, and purported to apply to all terms and conditions of employment. Rovira
sued under ERISA, which authorizes federal court suits by employees to enforce their
rights under ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. The court ruled that because
the non-discrimination policy was not contained in the formal benefit plan document,
it was not a part of the plan that could be enforced in an ERISA action in federal
court. Further, the court found that the promise of non-discrimination embodied in
the company's policy ran to employees, not to "third parties." By implication, had the
non-discrimination policy been contained within the plan documents, an ERISA en-
forcement suit might be available.
122. ERISA does not apply to employee benefit plans maintained by state or local
public employers. 29 U.S.C. 1003(b)(1) (1988).
123. Some of the notable lawsuits included Hinman v. Department of Personnel
Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985) (denying domestic partnership entitlement in den-
tal benefits plan for state employees); Anglin v. City of Minneapolis, File No. 88180
(Minneapolis Comm'n on Human Rts. 1992) (finding that city human rights ordi-
nance requires extension of domestic partnership benefits to city employees); Phillips
v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. 1992) (state law banning sex-
ual orientation discrimination does not require extension of partnership benefits to
state employees); Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Education, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App.
Div. 1992) (organization of gay teachers stated viable cause of action in seeking do-
mestic partnership benefits under a variety of constitutional and statutory theories).
124. For example, a successful combination of litigation and lobbying occurred in
New York City, where several city school teachers and the Gay Teachers Association
sued in state court, relying on a variety of constitutional and statutory theories, to
achieve domestic partnership insurance coverage. While the city's motion to dismiss
was pending, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates,
recognizing a domestic partnership family for purposes of rent control regulations.
Reacting to Braschi, then-Mayor Edward I. Koch issued an executive order in the
midst of the 1989 mayoral election, authorizing recognition of domestic partnership
families for the purposes of sick leave, bereavement leave, and hospital and prison
visitation rights for city employees, and establishing a partnership registry in the city
personnel office. Exec. Order No. 123 (Koch, 1989). While the trial judge refused to
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smaller scale, some municipalities and at least one state, Massachu-
setts, have extended family-related eligibility for some "non-eco-
nomic" benefits, such as sick leave, family leave, and bereavement
leave, sometimes by legislation and sometimes by executive or-
der.125 In addition, the states of Vermont and New York have ex-
dismiss the Gay Teachers suit, in Gay Teachers Association v. Board of Education,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 1991, at 22, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), a coalition of community groups
encouraged City Councilmember Carolyn Maloney to file a bill establishing a registry
in the city clerk's office and mandating recognition of domestic partner families for all
city benefits purposes through the device of an amendment to the city's human rights
ordinance. In 1992, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge's ruling, citing
Braschi and remanding the case for a full trial on the merits, Gay Teachers Associa-
tion v. Board of Education, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1992).
Mayor David N. Dinkins, partially fulfilling a campaign pledge, issued new execu-
tive orders expanding on the Koch orders, Exec. Orders Nos. 48 and 49 (Dinkins, Jan.
1993), although still falling short of full domestic partnership benefits, and announced
that he would support enactment of the domestic partnership bill. The mayor also
sent a letter to the state insurance commissioner, urging an appropriate interpretation
of the State Insurance Law that would allow insurance companies to sell group poli-
cies with domestic partnership coverage. Then, a newly-formed coalition of lesbian
and gay city employees filed a charge with the Human Rights Commission, asserting
that the city was violating its own human rights ordinance by failing to extend domes-
tic partnership benefits to its employees, and the Commission issued a probable cause
determination on May 28. Coalition of Lesbian & Gay City Employees v. City of
New York (N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rts., May 28, 1993).
As the 1993 mayoral election neared and lesbian and gay political organizations
targeted domestic partnership as their main campaign issue, the insurance commis-
sioner issued a letter adopting the necessary interpretation of the state insurance law,
and the mayor negotiated a settlement of the lawsuit with the plaintiffs, contingent
upon agreement with municipal unions, which was achieved just days before the elec-
tion. The trial judge entered an order dismissing the case contingent on the city pro-
viding the benefits as described in the settlement agreement, which newly-elected
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has acknowledged as binding on the city. Nonetheless, les-
bian and gay political groups planned to reintroduce a new version of the domestic
partnership bill in the newly-elected city council, hoping to provide a firmer ground-
ing for the continued operation of the benefit plan.
Municipalities that have passed domestic partnership ordinances include Ann Ar-
bor (Mich.), Atlanta (Ga.), Austin (Tex.), Berkeley (Cal.), Brookline (Mass.), Bur-
lington (Vt.), Cambridge (Mass.), East Lansing (Mich.), Minneapolis (Minn.), San
Francisco (Cal.), Seattle (Wash.), West Hollywood (Cal.). I make no claims of com-
pleteness for this list. The Boston City Council passed an ordinance that was vetoed
by Mayor Raymond Flynn, who simultaneously issued an executive order recognizing
domestic partner families of city employees for non-economic benefits. The District
of Columbia Council passed a domestic partnership law, but Congress prohibited the
District from spending any money to implement it. The Los Angeles City Council has
passed a domestic partnership ordinance, which awaits approval from the mayor as
this is written.
125. Adrian Walker, City Council OK's Gay-Couples Act; Permits Registration, En-
sures Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1993, at 38; Toni Locy, Weld Gives Family
Leave to Some Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1992, at 34.
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tended domestic partnership health insurance benefits to state
employees through collective bargaining. 126
While comparatively few employers recognize domestic partner-
ship families under their employee benefits plans, the number is
growing and the issue has become a topic of considerable discus-
sion in personnel management circles. As experience in operating
such plans accumulates, generating data on costs and administra-
tive issues, more employers may become convinced that extending
such benefits is a cost-effective way to make their workplaces more
attractive to a wider variety of potential employees. Depending on
the final form taken by current proposals to restructure the way
health care costs are covered in the United States, domestic part-
nership coverage may become either a significant subject of public
policy debate at the federal level, or irrelevant, as it would be, for
instance, under a single payor national health insurance system in
which eligibility for coverage does not hinge on family status.
E. Co-Parenting Rights
Parental rights for lesbians and gay men have always been a con-
troversial subject. Among the earliest reported court decisions in-
volving homosexuality are many relating to custody or visitation
claims asserted by lesbians or gay men for their children conceived
within traditional heterosexual marriages.127 While much progress
has been made in establishing that sexual orientation per se should
not be a disqualification for the exercise of parental rights, lesbians
and gay men still encounter difficulties in custody or visitation dis-
putes involving their own biological offspring, especially in jurisdic-
tions that retain criminal sodomy laws, such as Virginia and
Missouri.1 28 Judges express fear that the welfare of the children
126. Vermont Workers Win Health Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at A13; Jane
Gottlieb, PEF Agrees to Domestic Partner Benefits, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Sept. 28,
1994, at B2.
127. See, e.g., Nadler v. Superior Court, Sacramento County, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352
(Ct.App., 3rd Dist. 1967).
128. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d
164 (Mo. App. 1987). During 1993, national media attention focused on a Virginia
trial court decision awarding custody to a grandmother based primarily on the natural
mother's lesbian "lifestyle." Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. CH93JA0517-00 (Va. Cir. Ct.,
Sept. 7, 1993). The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App.
1994), but the grandmother is appealing the decision. See Elizabeth Kastor, The Bat-
tle for the Boy in the Middle, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993, at C-1; Dianna Marder &
Ellen O'Brien, For Lesbian, Gay Parents, Shaky Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 12,
1993, at E-1; Linda P. Campbell, Custody Ruling Fuels Gay Rights Discussion, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Sept. 12, 1993, at 25. For a more detailed discussion of Roe v. Roe and
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., see SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 332-35, 342-45.
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may be endangered by the parent's "illicit" lifestyle or relation-
ships with same-sex partners, and also opine that the children may
feel stigmatized by societal prejudice against their parents.129 Iron-
ically, in a case involving child custody in the context of an interra-
cial re-marriage, the Supreme Court has firmly indicated that the
latter concern should not take priority in a custody determina-
tion,130 but some judges have taken the view that the Court's
decision in that case turned on the special nature of racial discrimi-
nation and the treatment of race as a suspect classification under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 131
While every lesbian or gay custody or visitation case implicates
the recognition of a lesbian or gay family unit, the issues are
heightened in cases where a lesbian or gay couple seeks to consti-
tute a family unit with children and have that unit treated on an
equal basis with traditional family units founded on opposite-sex
married couples. In jurisdictions where the initial hurdle of estab-
lishing equal rights of lesbians and gay men to parent their own
natural-born offspring has been surpassed, some courts have been
receptive to taking the next step and recognizing the possibility
that both partners in the relationship should be treated as parents
with respect to the children they are raising.
The issue has come before the courts in several different scena-
rios: when a couple breaks up, and the partner who originally bore
or solely adopted the child (who may be referred to in court papers
and argument as the "birth parent," "natural parent" or "biological
parent") seeks to exclude the other partner from continued con-
tact; when the partner who originally bore or solely adopted the
child dies, and the other partner wishes to retain custody of the
child; when a child is conceived through alternative insemination,
and a known sperm donor seeks to establish parental rights over
the objections of the lesbian co-parents; and when a partner wishes
to become a legal parent through adoption of the child borne or
previously adopted by his or her same-sex partner.
1. Co-Parent Status After Dissolution of a Relationship
Courts have been least receptive to recognizing a lesbian and gay
family unit (and equal parental rights for both partners in the unit)
129. See cases cited supra, note 128.
130. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). "Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law," said the Court, "but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect." Id. at 433.
131. See S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App. 1987).
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in circumstances where the co-parents have ended their relation-
ship, with their child left in the custody of the birth or adoptive
parent, and without the co-parent having established a legal tie to
the child through adoption. With rare exceptions, the courts have
held that the partner who lacks such legal ties does not even have
standing to bring an action for custody or visitation. 132 The courts
have reached this conclusion without even getting into the question
whether custody or visitation by this partner would be in the best
interest of the child, which is the normal test in custody disputes
between birth or adoptive parents. 33
In Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.,' 3 4 for example, the courts
confronted a statutory regime in which the term "parent" was not
specifically defined. The statute authorized "either parent" to
bring an action to determine custody or visitation rights upon or
after the termination of a marriage. 35 Reflecting a well-estab-
lished hostility toward allowing persons other than natural parents
to interfere with the custody of a natural parent,'136 the court
treated the lesbian co-parent as a "biological stranger." The court
insisted that where a child was in the custody of a birth parent, that
parent's right to determine whether a particular "non-parent"
should have access to the child must be protected. In short, it was
presumed, absent "extraordinary circumstances," 37 that a birth
parent who is fit to have custody is the person best placed to decide
132. One extraordinary exception was an unpublished decision in Loftin v.
Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 2, 1984), in which the co-parent con-
testing custody was also the biological aunt of the child because her brother donated
the sperm used to conceive the child. There, the court found this blood relationship
sufficient to overcome the usual treatment of co-parents as "biological strangers"
lacking standing. See E.D. Shapiro and S. Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of
Birth Innovations Upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271 (1985-86),
which contains extensive quotations from the transcript and findings of the court. In
another case, a New Mexico court appeared to open the door to the possibility of
according recognition to a co-parent in the context of visitation, at least to the extent
of refusing to dismiss such a case on summary judgment before trial, A.C. v. C.B., 829
P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (1992).
133. See, e.g., Z.J.H., Interest of (Sporleder v. Hermes), 459 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1990); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
134. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). For a more detailed consideration of this case, see
SEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 371-76.
135. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988).
136. See, e.g., Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987) (denying paren-
tal standing to unmarried boyfriend of mother on grounds he was "biological
stranger").
137. The phrase "extraordinary circumstances" is taken from the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976), in which the
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what is in the best interest of that child in terms of custody and
visitation rights of "non-parents. ' 138 The court swept aside as un-
important a constellation of facts that tends to characterize such
cases: (1) the two women jointly planned to have the child; (2) fre-
quently the co-parent performs the insemination of the birth par-
ent; and (3) the two women promised to raise the child jointly and
treat each other as equal parents in terms of responsibility for the
child. In some cases the birth parent may (usually due to occupa-
tional constraints) actually spend less time with the child than the
other parent, who consequently may form a closer parental bond as
"primary caretaker." Perhaps most significantly, if the split-up oc-
curs far enough in time past the birth of the child for the child to
express an opinion, the child will usually consider both women to
be her mothers and express a desire to maintain contact with both.
Because the court in Alison D. adopted a formalistically narrow
construction of the term "parent," it rendered irrelevant for pur-
poses of its decision the very factors that would normally be con-
sidered crucially important in making a custody decision between
contending parents, the sum of which represents a judicial determi-
nation of the best interest of the child. As Judge Judith Kaye, dis-
senting in Alison D., observed, by adopting this approach to
standing under the Domestic Relations Law, the court had re-
treated from its "proper role" in a custody or visitation dispute: to
determine the best interest of the child.'39 The court had failed to
consider adequately whether, in order to be consistent with the
overall policy goal of the domestic relations law, the factual con-
stellation presented the sort of "extraordinary circumstance" that
would justify departure from the general rule.
In light of the earlier Brasch 4° decision, the Alison D. court had
in effect created a rather anomalous situation. If the relationship
between the mothers terminated because the "non-biological"
mother with whom they lived, a rent-controlled or stabilized ten-
ant, had died, the birth mother would presumably be allowed to
succeed to the leasehold as a "family member" of the deceased.
On the other hand, if the relationship ended without the co-par-
ent's death, the non-birth mother could not assert a legal claim, as
court acknowledged that there might be extraordinary circumstances where it would
be appropriate to consider a non-parent's claim to continued contact with a child.
138. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
139. Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 658.
140. See supra note 77.
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a "family member," in order to maintain personal contact with the
child.
Other cases cited above are to similar effect with one additional
factor. Unlike the couple in Alison D., whose agreements and un-
derstandings about their relationship to their child were entirely
oral, in some cases women contemplating such a family arrange-
ment put their agreement in writing. However, courts consider the
determination of custody and visitation issues to be a matter of
public interest that is to be decided solely by reference to principles
of family law, and have normally refused to give binding effect to
private agreements, whether written or oral, that would seek to
preempt the operation of established legal doctrines.'41
2. Co-Parent Rights on the Death of a Parent
Courts have been willing to recognize the existence of a family
unit consisting of a same-sex couple and a child in cases where the
birth mother dies in an accident or from illness and a struggle en-
sues between the birth mother's family of birth and the surviving
co-parent over custody of the child. In decisions from Florida14
and Vermont,'143 trial courts acknowledged the parent-child rela-
tionship that existed between the surviving co-parent and the child,
and determined that it was in the best interest of the child to re-
main with the co-parent. This result was particularly extraordinary
141. For example, in Sporleder v. Hermes, 459 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990),
the court held that enforcement of a written agreement between contending lesbian
co-parents that purported to govern physical custody of the child would be a violation
of public policy, since a statute was the sole determinant of third-party custody or
visitation rights, and the court considered a lesbian co-parent to be a "third party" if
she was neither a birth mother nor an adoptive mother. To similar effect is Georgia P.
v. Kerry B., a 1994 decision of the California Court of Appeal, First District, unre-
ported at the time of writing. See 1994 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 25 (March 1994).
142. In re Pearlman, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward Co.,
1989). Judge Robert C. Scott awarded custody of a ten-year old child to Janine Rat-
cliffe, the surviving domestic partner of Joan Pearlman, the child's birth mother, over
the objections of Pearlman's parents. See 1989 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 38-39.
Upon Joan's death, her parents authorized Janine to continue caring for the child, but
subsequently filed a petition to adopt the child and placed her with an aunt, cutting
off further contact with Janine. The child objected to this arrangement. Janine filed
suit to have adoption quashed and to obtain custody of the child. Id.
143. In re Hamilton (Vt. Probate Ct., June 30, 1989) (not published). Judge L. John
Cain ruled that Susan Bellemare, the domestic partner of Susan Hamilton, who had
died in an auto accident, should have temporary custody of Hamilton's infant son
pending probate of Hamilton's will, in which Hamilton had indicated that she desired
Bellemare to have custody of the child. Hamilton's parents argued that they or Ham-
ilton's sister should be appointed legal guardians of the child. On July 25, 1989, Judge
Cain upheld validity of the will and made Bellemare's appointment permanent. See
1989 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 46.
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in In re Pearlman, the Florida case, where the court's decision in-
cluded quashing an adoption decree that had already been granted
to the deceased mother's parents, and ignoring the public policy
embodied in Florida's statutory prohibition on adoption of chil-
dren by homosexuals. 144 The decision was possible because, in the
absence of a "natural parent," a court has wide discretion to make
a custody determination in the best interest of a child. In this case,
where the mother died after a prolonged struggle with cancer,
there was a strong factual showing that the child preferred to live
with Janine Ratcliffe, her mother's surviving partner. This arrange-
ment was in the child's best interest, at least partly because the
grandparents were elderly and ill. The court held that Ratcliffe's
sexuality was not an impediment to the guardianship, without men-
tioning that allowing the partner to adopt would be contrary to
Florida law.
Responding to the AIDS-related phenomenon of a growing
number of unmarried mothers with AIDS desiring to make appro-
priate advance arrangements for the post-mortem custody and rais-
ing of their children, New York recently enacted a Standby
Guardianship statute, generally available to custodial parents fac-
ing incapacity or death who desire to formalize their preferences
with respect to custody of their children when they are no longer
able to care for them. 145 Had such a statute been available in Flor-
ida, Joan Pearlman could have designated Janine Ratcliffe as
standby guardian and several years of litigation could have been
avoided.
3. Co-Parent Rights as Against a Known Sperm Donor
A New York trial court recently recognized a family unit of a
same-sex lesbian couple with two children, one born by each of the
women through donor insemination with a known donor, in
Thomas S. v. Robin y1 46 The recognition of the family unit came
in the context of determination of a custody petition filed by one of
the donors with respect to the child conceived from his sperm. The
women had decided to obtain sperm from gay men as their donors,
and had an unwritten agreement with each donor that he would
144. FLA. STAT. CH. 63.042 (3) (1992).
145. N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT § 1726 (McKinney 1993). A
practice commentary by Margaret Valentine Turano, published in the 1994 pocket
part, specifically references the plight of single mothers with AIDS as the main moti-
vation for enacting the a law.
146. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fain. Ct., N.Y. County, 1993), appeal pending, App.
Div., 1st Dept. (argued Feb. 24, 1994).
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not assert parental rights or take any parental role with respect to
the children unless the mothers requested such contact. The
mothers, who lived in New York, did contact the petitioner, who
lived in San Francisco, when their daughter was three years old,
and initiated contact and bicoastal visiting that extended over sev-
eral years. However, the donor eventually wanted to expand his
role to a greater extent than the mothers desired; when they re-
fused, he filed a petition seeking a declaration of parental rights
and a court-ordered visitation schedule, at which time the mothers
cut off further contact.14
7
Family Court Judge Kaufmann denied the father's petition, em-
bracing the theory of equitable estoppel, 148 apparently as a way of
avoiding the problem created by Alison D. v. Virginia M.149 Under
that decision, the non-birth mother of the child would be consid-
ered a "biological stranger" with no parental rights. Instead, Judge
Kaufmann treated the women and their children as a family unit.
Genetic testing showed that the donor was the biological father of
the child, so normally a declaration of paternity would follow as a
matter of course. But if Judge Kaufmann had granted the donor's
petition, the possibility would exist that the donor could gain cus-
tody if the birth mother were to become incapacitated or die, and
could totally exclude the non-birth mother from further contact
with the child.
Judge Kaufmann used the equitable estoppel theory to block the
necessity to make a "best interests" analysis as between biological
parents. 50 Noting that under the original agreement between the
donor and the mother, the donor waived all rights to assert pater-
nity, and that the donor had made no attempt to assert parental
rights until the child was over ten years old, Judge Kaufmann de-
cided to view the case from the perspective of the child.' 5 1 He
found that the donor's attempt to establish paternity had caused
the child "anxiety, nightmares, and psychological harm," and that
the child "views this proceeding as a threat to her sense of family
security. For her, a declaration of paternity would be a statement
147. Id. at 377-79.
148. "Equitable estoppel" is a legal principle in which the action or inaction of one
party induces reliance by another to his or her detriment. Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at
381.
149. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (where a woman who had a live-in relationship with
the child's mother was denied her habeas corpus petition, brought to obtain visitation
rights after termination of the parties' relationship).
150. Id. at 382.
151. Id.
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that her family is other than what she knows it to be and needs it to
be.' 1 52 Given these findings, the judge concluded that ordering vis-
itation was not in the child's best interest, even if the judge had
decided not to resort to estoppel and to declare the donor's pater-
nity. But it was the recognition of the cohesive family unit (and the
unspoken recognition that the unit would be endangered, in light
of Alison D., by a paternity declaration) that undoubtedly sparked
the judge's decision to raise the estoppel against the donor.153
The Thomas S. decision marks a decided contrast with the many
cases in which courts refuse to recognize the existence of a family
unit when same-sex parents split up. Perhaps the key distinction is
that the family at issue was intact and functioning, while in other
cases, the unit had been ruptured and the continued involvement
of the non-birth parent seemed likely to cause tension and instabil-
ity in the child's life. While it is true that such tension and instabil-
ity may also be present when traditional opposite-sex marriages
break up and the non-custodial parent continues to exercise visita-
tion rights, visitation rights are almost always granted in those
cases because of the well-established constitutional rights of a bio-
logical parent.154 Since a co-parent is a "biological stranger," the
courts have no such constraints. This does not justify the results in
the co-parent cases, but rather attempts to explain the seemingly
inconsistent approach of the Thomas S. court in sub silentio taking
into account the possibly disruptive effect in the future on this
same-sex family unit if the donor's paternity were to be declared.
4. Co-Parent Rights Acquired Through Adoption
Perhaps the most dramatic example of recognition of a same-sex
family comes when a court participates by adoption in creating
such a family through the establishment of ties of legal parental
status between a child and two parents of the same-sex. The Ver-
mont 5 5 and Massachusetts 156 Supreme Courts took this step in his-
toric decisions in 1993. In each of these cases, a lesbian couple
152. Id.
153. There was also an unspoken recognition that, in light of Alison D., the family
unit would be endangered by a declaration of paternity.
154. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the Supreme Court recog-
nized the parental rights of an unwed father as superior to a state policy that gave no
weight to the unwed father's biological tie in determining custody of children whose
mother had died.
155. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
156. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of Susan, 619
N.E.2d 323 (Mass. 1993).
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desiring to raise children planned the birth of a child through do-
nor insemination of one member of the couple. After the child was
born, the couple sought to create a legally-recognized family unit
by establishing an adoptive relationship between the non-birth
mother and the child. The couple did not wish to sever the paren-
tal relationship between the birth mother and the child, but rather
to effectively establish that the child had two legal mothers.157
In the Vermont case, the Probate Court denied the non-birth
mother's adoption petition, relying on a section of the adoption law
that appears to require cutting off parental rights when an unre-
lated person, other than the parent's spouse (i.e., a step-parent),
adopts a child. 58 On appeal, the state supreme court held that
construing the cut-off provision to deny the petition would under-
mine the state's "primary concern" in the adoption law, which is
"to promote the welfare of children.' 1 59 In the opinion for the
court, Justice Denise R. Johnson focused on the step-parent excep-
tion contained in the cut-off provision, asserting: "the legislature
recognized that it would be against common sense to terminate the
biological parent's rights when that parent will continue to raise
and be responsible for the child, albeit in a family unit with a part-
ner who is biologically unrelated to the child. 160 The lesbian co-
parent petitioner was seen by the court as analogous to a step-par-
ent, and the policy justification for letting a step-parent adopt with-
out affecting the parental rights of the birth parent applied equally
in this case: to secure for the child the benefits of being legally
related to both parents who are raising the child.161
The realities of diverse family structures had outpaced the statu-
tory law, and Justice Johnson recognized, on behalf of the court,
the need to construe that law in a way that would provide rein-
forcement for the actual family unit that the same-sex couple had
created:
It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composi-
tion of today's families. It is the advancement of reproductive
157. Id. Several trial courts around the country, mostly in unpublished decisions,
had approved adoptions creating such same-sex families. See Matter of Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1992)) and In re Adoption of Minor (T.), 60 U.S.L.W.
2191 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1991) (unpublished) and cases cited therein.
158. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 448 (1993). The provision contains an exception in the case of a step-parent
seeking to adopt after marrying the birth parent.
159. B.V.L.B., 628 A.2d at 1273.
160. Id. at 1274.
161. Id.
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technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles
that have produced families in which a biological, and therefore
a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle.
But it is the courts that are required to define, declare and pro-
tect the rights of children raised in these families, usually upon
their dissolution ... It is surely in the best interests of children,
and the state, to facilitate adoptions in these circumstances so
that legal rights and responsibilities may be determined now and
any problems that arise later may be resolved within the recog-
nized framework of domestic relations laws. 1 62
In the Massachusetts cases, by contrast, the lesbian co-parents
filed joint adoption petitions rather than having the non-birth
mother file a single adoption petition.163 In Adoption of Tammy,
the Middlesex County Probate Court 'found that the adoption
would be in the child's best interest and approved it, but simultane-
ously reported the case to the Court of Appeals to "secure [the]
decree from any attack in the future on jurisdictional grounds."'" 6
In Adoption of Susan, the Suffolk County Probate Court reserved
judgment and applied to the court of appeals for a ruling on
whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the petition. 65 The
Supreme Judicial Court approved the adoption in Tammy and re-
manded the petition in Susan for appropriate further fact-finding,
since the Suffolk County Probate Court had not held an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether the adoption would be in Su-
san's best interest.166
The Massachusetts adoption statute provides that a "person of
full age" may petition to adopt "as his child another person
younger than himself, unless such other person is his or her wife or
husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half
blood." '167 In his opinion, Justice John M. Greany noted that an-
other Massachusetts statute, setting forth rules of statutory inter-
pretation, provides that "[w]ords importing the singular number
may extend and be applied to several persons" unless the result
would be either "inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-
making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute.' ' 68
162. Id. at 1276.
163. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 315; Adoption of Susan, 619 N.E.2d at 323.
164. 619 N.E.2d at 316.
165. 619 N.E.2d at 323.
166. Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; Susan, 619 N.E.2d at 324.
167. MASS. GEN. L., ch. 210, § 1 (1981 & Supp. 1994). There is no express provision
for joint adoptions, although the law requires that if the petitioner is married, the
petitioner's spouse, if competent to adopt, must join the petition. 619 N.E.2d at 318.
168. Id. at 319 (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4, § 6 (1981 & Supp. 1994).
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Greany found that neither objection would arise in this case, par-
ticularly because the legislature had specified in the adoption stat-
ute which combinations of adoptive parties would be expressly
forbidden.169 More importantly, allowing the adoption would only
benefit the child, for a variety of reasons specified by the court:
[I]t will.., serve to provide her with a significant legal relation-
ship which may be important in her future. At the most practi-
cal level, adoption will entitle Tammy to inherit from Helen's
family trusts and from Helen and her family under the law of
intestate succession, to receive support from Helen who will be
legally obliged to provide such support, to be eligible for cover-
age under Helen's health insurance policies and to be eligible
for social security benefits in the event of Helen's disability or
death.
Of equal, if not greater significance, adoption will enable
Tammy to preserve her unique filial ties to Helen in the event
that Helen and Susan separate or Susan predeceases Helen....
In some cases, children have been denied the affection of a func-
tional parent who has been with them since birth, even when it
is apparent that this outcome is contrary to the children's best
interests. Adoption serves to establish legal rights and arise in
the future, issues of custody and visitation may be promptly re-
solved by reference to the best interests of the child within the
recognized framework of the law.'7°
Thus, the Massachusetts court joined the Vermont court in decid-
ing that the adoption statute should be interpreted in a way that
accommodated the reality of family diversity as presented in the
petition. Since the child would be living with these two parents in
any event, it made sense to bolster the child's security and welfare
by creating legal ties of the parent-child relationship for the non-
birth mother. The Massachusetts and Vermont high court cases
provide an extremely persuasive precedent for the approval of such
adoption petitions in other jurisdictions. 171
F. Failures
To avoid painting a false picture of unalloyed success in persuad-
ing the courts to recognize lesbian and gay families it is worth not-
169. Id.
170. Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted).
171. However, these opinions were not persuasive enough for the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which denied a lesbian co-parent adoption petition based on a strict
construction of that state's adoption statute. In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516
N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
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ing a few significant failures. There have been several instances in
which someone attempted to use a statutory or common law princi-
ple that normally applies only to legally recognized families and
was rebuffed by the court, even though policies underlying the stat-
utory or common law principle might be argued to apply to the
reality of the lesbian or gay family involved.
One notable example is De Santo v. Barnsley,72 in which the
Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected an attempt by a gay man to
divorce his same-sex partner. John De Santo and William Barnsley
held a ceremony on June 14, 1970, before a gathering of their
friends, where they purported to marry each other.1 73 They ex-
changed anniversary cards on June 14 in subsequent years, and
lived together until November 15, 1980. Upon the breakup of their
partnership, they apparently had serious disagreements about how
to disentangle their finances and assets. As a result De Santo filed
a complaint in state court seeking a divorce, equitable distribution
of assets, and alimony. Conceding that he and Barnsley had not
contracted a statutory marriage, De Santo claimed that their cere-
mony and subsequent cohabitation amounted to a common law
marriage and made the divorce laws applicable to them to resolve
the present controversy. 74
While it might seem unusual to propose that legal divorce is a
benefit of legal marriage, this case illustrates how that may be so.
Lesbians and gay men who form family units may generate intri-
cately entangled finances. One member of the couple may forego
career opportunities to support the other. Same sex couples may
include one partner who supported the other during professional
education, or who abandoned a career to work in a business started
by the other. In the absence of a binding partnership agreement
the economic relationship can be quite complicated on dissolution
and the availability of a neutral party with binding legal powers to
divide the assets and, in an appropriate case, awarding alimony
may be quite useful.
In De Santo, however, the court assumed without discussion that
unless the court first found the two men to be married, the divorce
law could not confer jurisdiction to resolve the controversy be-
tween De Santo and Barnsley.175 Consequently, the court focused
virtually its entire opinion on the question whether same-sex
172. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. 1984).
173. Id. at 952.
174. Id. at 952, 956.
175. Id. at 956.
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couples could contract a common law marriage, and ultimately
adopted the same line of reasoning as some of the same-sex mar-
riage opinions: the union of two men or two women is not marriage
as the term is defined. 7 6 Thus, the implicit holding was that be-
cause the men were never "married," they could not be "di-
vorced." But the court never really explained why it could not use
its equitable powers to make a fair property division between these
men.
1 77
In Matter of Cooper,78 Ernest Chin, a gay man whose lover died
in 1988 after they had lived together for four years, tried to assert a
claim for "spousal election" against the estate. However, William
Cooper did not die intestate.179 His will designated Chin as the
residuary legatee, but made a specific bequest of real property to
Cooper's prior lover.180 Chin claimed that the property bequest
came to about 80% of the assets in the estate, and asserted that he
should be entitled to a full share of a spouse as provided in New
York's Estate Powers and Trusts Law.' 81 The Kings County Surro-
gate's Court ruled that only a marital spouse can exercise the right
of spousal election, and rejected Chin's claim that excluding him
from this right was unconstitutional. 182
The Appellate Division sided with the surrogate, citing Baker v.
Nelson18 3 for the proposition that the gender-neutral language in
New York's Domestic Relations Law did not compel or allow the
court to treat the relationship between Chin and Cooper as a mar-
184 Ci ariage for this purpose. Chin had argued that the recent Court of
Appeals decision in Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co.185 showed a willing-
176. The court refused to deal with the argument that failure to recognize a com-
mon law marriage for a same sex couple violated the state's constitutional ban on sex
discrimination, on the ground that De Santo had not made this argument in the trial
court. 476 A.2d at 956. It is interesting to query how the Hawaii Supreme Court
would have reacted to such an argument were common law marriage recognized in
Hawaii.
177. Ironically, the court devoted a paragraph of its opinion to a prior case, Knauer
v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. 1983), holding that Pennsylvania would recognize
a "palimony" cause of action which is an award that arises out of non-marital relation-
ships. However, without any discussion, the court failed to extend the logic of the
palimony precedents to this case where it confronted an allegation of an actual com-
mitment ceremony before witnesses. De Santo, 476 A.2d at 955.
178. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993).
179. Id. at 797.
180. Id.
181. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994).
182. In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Surr. Ct. 1990).
183. See supra note 13.
184. Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
185. See supra note 77.
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ness by the courts to adopt functional definitions of family law
terms in order to effectuate the broad purpose of a statute.8 6 In
Braschi, that meant that the goal of preventing eviction of family
members when a tenant dies would be served by recognizing a sur-
viving gay partner as a family member.187 In Cooper, Chin had
argued, the goal of the spousal election provision would be served
by recognizing that he and Cooper had been functional spouses.188
The Appellate Division had a ready counter to this argument: the
Court of Appeals' more recent decision in Allison D. v. Virginia
M.,189 where the court had refused to stretch the statutory defini-
tion of parent to a same-sex co-parent in order to confer jurisdic-
tion in a custody or visitation dispute. 9 The Appellate Division
also rejected Chin's constitutional arguments, asserting that a stat-
utory classification that discriminated against gay people should be
tested by the least demanding standard-the rational basis test-
and that the State's interest in fostering marriage as an institution
for conceiving and raising children justified excluding same-sex
couples from marriage. 191
Finally, there is the case of Coon v. Joseph,'92 where the court
held that a gay man who witnessed a city bus driver verbally and
physically assault the man's "life partner" could not state a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the two
men did not have the "close relationship" required for this tort. 93
The Coon court held that the tort could be asserted when the
"plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with the
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant rela-
tionship."'194 In prior cases the California courts found that a close
enough relationship existed when the plaintiff and victim were par7
ent and child (or foster child), husband and wife, or common law
186. 564 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
187. See supra note 77.
188. 564 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
189. See supra note 134.
190. 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
191. Id. at 800.
192. 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
193. The California Supreme Court first recognized the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). In 1988 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court further refined its analysis in Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal.
1988), holding that the surviving member of an unmarried childless heterosexual
couple could not state a cause of action in a case where the couple was involved in an
automobile action due to the negligence of another driver, and the woman died.
194. Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
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husband and wife. 95 On the other hand, those same courts found
that the relationship was not close enough between unmarried het-
erosexual cohabitants, cousins, or between a mother and daughter
and a minor child who had been treated as if he were a member of
their family, although unrelated to them.196
Despite the plaintiff's allegation of an emotionally significant,
stable and exclusive relationship with the victim in this case, the
court found that it was not "close" enough to satisfy the California
test.197 The plaintiff had particularly relied on Ledger v. Tippitt,198
where the plaintiff and the victim lived together for two years,
twice attempted to marry, the plaintiff was pregnant with the vic-
tim's child, and the victim bled to death in the plaintiff's arms. The
court allowed the action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress while denying a claim for loss of consortium, asserting that
there is no "more fundamental family relationship than one which
is created when two parents establish a home with their natural
child." 199 But the Coon court found this case "inapposite," assert-
ing that a same-sex couple could never qualify for recognition of a
"de facto" marital relationship because "the Legislature has made
a determination that a legal marriage is between a man and a
woman."
200
This reasoning drew a dissent from presiding Justice Clinton W.
White, who argued that the court had ignored the reason why the
California Supreme Court had adopted the "close relationship" re-
quirement, which might be satisfied in a close homosexual relation-
ship.201 Noting that the courts had recognized the tort in cases
195. Id. (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), Ochoa v. Superior Court,
703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985) (parent-child); Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California,
127 Cal. Rptr 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (parent-foster child); Krouse v. Graham, 562
P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977) (husband-wife); Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, Inc., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (by implication) (common-law husband-wife)).
196. Id. (citing Drew v. Drake, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (unmarried
cohabitants); Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (cous-
ins); Kately v. Wilkinson, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (unrelated minor
child)).
197. 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
198. 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
199. Id. at 828 (quoting MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d
453 (Cal. 1984)). In a case involving an engaged, cohabiting heterosexual couple, the
New Jersey Supreme Court recently found that there was a sufficiently close relation-
ship to sustain a tort action, despite the lack of a legal relation between the victim and
the plaintiff. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).
200. 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
201. Id. at 879 (White, J., dissenting).
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where the plaintiff and the victim were not married, such as Ledger
v. Tippet, Justice White insisted that
[w]hen marriage is not a requirement for recovery, there is no
reason to distinguish between heterosexual relationships and
homosexual relationships in determining whether the relation-
ship is significant and stable ... In a contemporary society (and
particularly in San Francisco) it is foreseeable that a homosexual
relationship might exist.2°2
In each of the three cases above, the courts refused to recognize
a de facto spousal relationship, even though such recognition might
have effectuated the underlying policies that the plaintiffs were try-
ing to invoke in their lawsuits. In effect, the courts rejected the
plaintiffs' attempt to make an "end run" around the lack of legal
same-sex marriage by substituting the "functional family" concept
for the marital status requirement contained in statutory or com-
mon law policy. These cases illustrate both the limitations of the
piecemeal approach taken toward achieving particularistic recogni-
tion of same-sex families, as well as the timidity of some courts in
shying from innovation, even in circumstances where their residual
equitable powers might justify intervening to achieve justice be-
tween parties.
IV. Conclusion
The movement for lesbian and gay rights in the United States is
a young movement, and in many parts of the country it is still
mired in the first stage of Legalization.20 3 More than twenty states
still maintain laws penalizing much of the sexual activity in which
lesbians and gay men might want to engage, as does the federal
202. 237 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83. However, Justice White concluded that the assault
on the victim in this case was not serious enough to qualify for the tort because there
was no allegation that the victim was significantly injured by the defendant's action of
punching him in the face, and so concurred with the majority's decision to dismiss the
case. Id. at 833. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Betty Barry-Deal com-
mented that "it is the obligation of the Legislature to examine the question whether
people in committed relationships, both heterosexual and homosexual, other than
those meeting the legal requirements for marriage, should be accorded recognition
giving rise to all, or selected legal rights traditionally reserved to married persons." Id.
at 878.
203. Most of the significant lesbian and gay rights organizations now active were
formed following the Stonewall riots although some earlier gay rights organizations
date back to the early 1950s. For a historical treatment of the emergence of the les-
bian and gay rights movement in the United States beginning after World War II see
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A Ho-
MOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970 (1983).
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government for members of the armed services and those present
on federal property (such as federal parks).,0 4 In this light, it is
remarkable that the third stage of liberation-the Normalization
process that includes societal recognition for lesbian and gay fami-
lies-has already had so many successes, including legislative en-
actments such as domestic partnership ordinances and judicial
pronouncements such as Braschi and Baehr.
While the Normalization stage seems to provoke the fiercest
backlash from those resistant to social change, as evidenced by the
ballot initiative campaigns that began in the late 1980s and appear
likely to accelerate over the next few years, it is perhaps the most
crucial of the three stages for achieving what is truly the "gay
agenda": the ability of lesbians and gay men to participate as first
class citizens without encountering any special barriers in their en-
joyment of the "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" that
Thomas Jefferson proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence
to be the birthright of every person in a free society.
204. See NAN D. HUNTER, SHERRYL E. MICHAELSON AND THOMAS B. STODDARD,
THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 118-25, 148-75 (3d ed. 1992) (Appendix,
listing state laws).
